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Abstract: Viewed in a wider context of paid and unpaid informal economic activities, 
the shadow economy highlights the little recognized ambivalence of social capital as 
both potentially positive and negative in outcomes for different groups in the economy. 
Using a concept of social capital as access to durable networks of actual and virtual 
resources as claimed by Pierre Bourdieu, I examine the shadow economy as a source of 
both resilience and repression, intimately connected to the formal economy and 
ultimately tied to a neo-liberal agenda. I draw from review activities I have previously 
conducted on the informal economy in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and from 
research on social capital in the economy in a European context. 
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Although conventionally defined as economic activity that, for taxation and measurement 
purposes, is beyond the reach of governmental regulation, the shadow economy is now growing 
globally to the extent that more and more policy commentators are identifying a tendency to 
incorporate such activity in GDP calculations (Gazzeta del Sud Online 2014; Hetq 2014). 
Politically, we can interpret this as an indicator of an inevitable trend inherent in neo-liberal 
deregulation of labor markets, increasing competition, driving down wages and working 
conditions, and undermining the advances made by organized labor. In a counter trend to such 
acknowledgement, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OECD) and the 
European Union (EU) have pursued policy measures for many years to bear down on the shadow 
economy, particularly due to the extent of loss of tax revenue (e.g., European Commission 
2007a). Yet, some suggest that the growth of the shadow economy harbors indications of labor 
resilience in the face of capital restructuring, within which the support and leverage of social 
capital is central. Such ambivalence, contradictory characteristics, and trends arise because of the 
diverse ways in which the shadow economy is conceptualized, discussed, and related to associated 
phenomena. This is compounded by a well-documented variance in the definition of social 
capital. Here, I utilize the kernel of the concept of social capital offered by Pierre Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) who view relationships as resources available to individuals and 
groups, thus enabling economic advantage.  
In this article, I examine and define the concept of shadow economy, associating it to related 
informal economic activity in a typology before considering the scale of the shadow economy. I 
also deploy the Bourdeusian concept of social capital to provide an understanding of aspects of 
the shadow economy. What this reveals is a focus on the negative outcomes of features of social 
capital in the context of the shadow economy, which stand in stark contrast to the usually positive 
portrayal that the concept seems to enjoy. Yet, there is also a perspective that argues about the 
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existence of positive outcomes emerging from the presence of social capital in the shadow 
economy. This form of social capital enables coping and survival strategies in certain economic 
contexts, in addition to the nurturing of entrepreneurship. But, as noted above, one can also 
argue that the positive presentation of social capital in the shadow economy serves a political 
purpose of promoting and legitimating the progress of neo-liberal deregulation. I explore both 
the variegated character of the shadow economy and the deployment of social capital in this 
paper. I draw from review activities I have previously conducted for the UK government (Evans, 
Syrett and Williams 2006) as well as research on social capital (European Commission 2007b). 
However, it is important to first denote that there is a danger both in conceiving the shadow 
economy in isolation from the formal economy and in seeing it as somehow a product of 
economic agents separate from the wider political economic structuring of the global capitalist 
economy by governments and big business. Writing in the mid1980s, Ray Pahl (1984, 114) made 
the observation that “interest in what came to be referred to as ‘informal’ work developed among 
sociologists, social anthropologists in the 1970s largely through the study of marginal urban 
workers in Third World cities.”. It is no coincidence that at a time when advanced economies 
were shifting from manufacturing to service economy, to more fragmented work organization, 
to deregulation and increased economic flexibility in the face of global capitalist restructuring, 
there was increasing evidence of interest in informal economic activity. Such shifts, variously 
referred to as late capitalism (Mandel 1975), post-industrialization (Bell 1973; Kumar 1978), or 
post-fordism (Amin 1994; Meegan 1988) — and perhaps best characterized as “disorganized 
capitalism” (Lash and Urry, 1987) — both require and are dependent upon the growth of 
informal economic activity. As Jonathan Gershuny (1985, 129) asserts, “the informal economy 
… is of course not a separate economy at all but an integral part of the system by which work, 
paid and unpaid, satisfies human needs.” Moreover, the extent of state involvement and 
management of the formal economy through income tax rates and thresholds, rates of indirect 
taxation on consumption, taxation on the importation of goods and services, social security and 
benefit legislation, business and labor market regulation, policies on immigration and asylum 
seekers, and entitlements to engage in formal employment and their variation within and across 
different countries and trade areas, will structure the extent of shadow economic activity across 
the globe.  
 
The Shadow Economy 
 
The importance of a clear definition about the so-called “shadow economy” is reflected in the 
great variation in estimates as to its extent, as evident in the next section. A broad definition 
treats the shadow economy as “market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or 
illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP” (Smith 1994, 18). But a still 
broader definition can be obtained by including the possibility that many goods and services in 
many parts of the world may not appear traded through cash transaction, but rather through 
barter. Moreover, a case can be made that the focus should be only upon legal goods and services, 
so as to avoid consideration of illegal trades (e.g., drugs, prostitution, stolen or counterfeit goods 
and trafficking of humans, and weapons), the legal focus of which is criminal rather than civil, 
contingent on where the legal boundaries are in different societies. On this basis, Friedrich 
Schneider and Colin C. Williams (2013, 25) define the shadow economy as “all market-based 
production of legal goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for 
the following reasons: 
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 to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; 
 to avoid payment of social security contributions; 
 to avoid having to meet certain legal labour market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc.; and 
 to avoid complying with certain administrative obligations” 
 
Although Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Büehn, and Claudio E. Montenegro (2010, 6) have 
derived their calculations of the size of shadow economies by focusing their definition of a 
shadow economy upon “those economic activities and the income derived from them that 
circumvent or otherwise avoid government regulation, taxation or observation.”  
Such variation in definition of economic activities outside of the formal and 
observed/apparent economy raises some important issues. These issues are not just about what 
should be included, but also about power relations and what might be considered to be the 
negative and positive implications of such activity. This is reflected in a host of related 
terminologies, which broadly discuss similar phenomena and incorporate what sectors are 
involved in the shadow economy, including: informal (Gershuny 1979; Jordan and Travers 
1998); underground (Cardi and Passerini 2001; Giles and Johnson 2002; Fortin, Lacroix  and 
Montmarquette 2002); black (Lyssiotou, Pashardes and Stengos 1999; Thomas 2000); 
undeclared (Matemen and Renooy 2002; OECD 2000); hidden (Battarcharyya, 1999; Dixon 
1999; NAO 2008); and non-observed (OECD 2002). If we commence from the broadest possible 
consideration of such activities, the informal economy, then we should incorporate 
considerations as to whether we are referring to both paid and unpaid economic activities. In 
this regard, a four-fold typology might be considered that clearly differentiates paid and unpaid 
activity, but includes illegal economic activity in the overall picture since there are clear 
connections between this and what I call paid informal work. Indeed, this reflects the wider 
connections between formal and informal economic activity (see below).  
The definition of informal economic activity I adopt, therefore, is characterized by a clear 
division between paid and unpaid informal economic activities. I then further sub-divide these 
economic activities to generate four categories (Evans, Syrett and Williams 2006), as shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Illegal economic activity — remunerated activities, generating goods and services that are 
forbidden by law and/or are unlawful when provided by unauthorized producers.  
Paid informal economic activity —  an activity that is remunerated, hidden, and not registered 
with or by the state, but the goods and services provided through it are otherwise deemed legal. 
Self-provisioning — a usually unremunerated activity that is undertaken by household members 
for themselves and/or for other household members. 
Mutual aid — an unremunerated activity carried out by members of households for members 
of other households in the wider community. 
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Table 1. Categories of Informal Economic Activity 
 
Activity Remuneration Characteristics Agents 
Illegal economic 
activity Paid 
Goods and services that are 
forbidden by law and/or are unlawful 
when provided by unauthorized 
producers 
Individuals and groups of 
criminals 
Informal 
economic 
activity 
Paid 
Hidden and not registered with/or by 
the state, but the goods and services 
provided through which are deemed 
otherwise legal 
Independent individuals, but 
often organized by and 
dependent upon other 
individuals or firms within the 
formal economy 
Self-provisioning Unpaid 
Self-servicing activity (e.g., cleaning, 
cooking, and care) undertaken for/by 
household members  
Members of households (usually 
female), supporting themselves 
and other household members 
Mutual aid Unpaid 
Social- servicing activity (e.g., 
cleaning, cooking, and care) 
undertaken by household members 
for other households    
Individual members of 
households or informal 
groupings often organized on a 
neighborhood basis 
 
 
The latter two categories of unpaid economic activity conducted to support and maintain 
households and wider community relationships, respectively, have been the subject of studies, 
generally highlighting the importance of social capital in the emergence and maintenance of such 
activities (Cattell and Evans 1999; Evans 2007; Williams and Windebank 2000, 2001). My focus 
in terms of conventionally defined shadow economy is on the first two categories of paid 
economic activity. However, as it will become apparent, the unpaid informal economic activity 
also highlights more subtle associations between social capital and the shadow economy, and its 
function, in support of the neo-liberal project. 
 
Illegal Economic Activity 
 
This is economic activity that involves criminality and, from that perspective, it is clearly activity 
that is even more likely to be concealed than paid informal economic activity. To distinguish this 
from mainstream criminal activity, the OECD (2002) introduces the idea that such activity 
becomes primarily economic activity since it involves consensual transactions between the 
participating parties. The most common illegal economic activities to consider are those 
involving the provision of class A and B drugs, sex, alcohol, tobacco, counterfeit currency, money 
laundering, and illegal labor. Much of this activity is controlled by networks of gangs operating 
in organized crime. That such gangs rely, to a significant degree, on relationships of trust between 
their members and those on the periphery has been extensively evidenced (Arlachi 1986; 
Coleman 1987; Coles 2001; von Lampe and Johnson 2004). It is rare, however, that we talk of 
this in terms of social capital other than in terms of a “down-side” (Portes and Landolt, 1996), 
relating more to the outcomes of social capital than to context.  Such down-side social capital is 
a reference to the strength of bonding social capital in some groups to the extent of generating 
insularity and social exclusion. The importance of strong bonding social capital is especially 
evident in tying individual members to group loyalty and codes of silence (e.g., omerta). But here 
I am referring more to a “dark side” of social capital that relates to the context and purpose of 
the behavior, and concerns the extent to which illegal and criminal economic activity emerges 
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from and relies upon certain types of social capital — most often referred to as “negative” or 
“perverse” social capital (Rubio 1997). In and of itself, social capital, despite the heavy 
connotations of positivity, constitutes a relationship that can be either positive or negative (such 
as “solidarity,” often evident in criminal networks and right wing cadres as well as among 
progressive worker groups, locally and globally). The presence of social capital in relationships 
can serve a darker side of illegal and criminal activities in the shadow economy. It can be an 
important component in maintaining trust and silence concerning the activities of organizations, 
formally engaged in legitimate economic activity, but which might also be directly or indirectly 
involved in the shadow economy. 
 
Paid Informal Economic Activity 
 
The classic definition of “shadow economy” refers to economic activities that are undeclared to 
state authorities for taxation and other regulatory purposes. This covers a wide range of 
interconnected activities. It can involve individuals working in whole or in part as self-employed 
and not declaring the income for tax purposes, or possibly not registering and complying with a 
range of regulations on trading and business activity. It can also involve individuals claiming state 
unemployment benefits while actually being employed. Revenues lost through tax evasion (both 
income tax and forms of indirect and value added taxation) and benefit fraud are areas of 
significant concern to governments in advanced economies (European Commission 2007; 
Grabiner 2000). Yet, more is lost through corporate tax avoidance on the part of major 
transnational corporations. Evidence across a number of economies indicates that regularly tax 
avoidance far outweighs the (more media-hyped) benefit fraud. Evidence from the UK’s 
Department of Works and Pensions (DWP 2014) indicates that, in 2013–2014, just 0.7 percent 
of benefits were overpaid due to fraud. This totaled £1.2 billion over the year and was less than 
both accidental overpayments due to error (£2.2 billion) and underpayments of benefit to those 
entitled (£1.3 billion). This is a small amount in the context of a public spending that totals £700 
billion, £150 billion of which is spent on welfare and pensions. The tax gap, on the other hand, 
(the difference between estimates of what the UK’s government should receive and what they 
estimate they will get) for 2012–2013 stood at £30 billion (HMRC 2013). Of this gap, almost £5 
billion is considered to be from tax evasion and £3 billion from stealthy measures on the part of 
corporations and individuals to avoid taxes. It should be mentioned that these are considered 
very conservative estimates, and the actual tax revenue loss may be much bigger. 
Also prevalent and hard to detect is the extent of undeclared and “off the books” work 
conducted by those that are already engaged in formal employment, whether through an 
employer (“dependent”) or on their own account (“independent”). Such “moonlighting” is 
difficult to detect not just due to cash-in-hand payments, but also because the individual or firm 
is often already legitimately registered for tax and other regulatory purposes. An interesting aspect 
of such activity, and its contribution to the level of paid informal economic activity, is that 
“moonlighting is usually the preserve of more affluent workers using their social capital networks 
of associates and customers, whereas the stereotypical image of undeclared employment usually 
involves poorer and unskilled workers (Williams and Windebank 2000, 2002).  
Much of the attention on paid informal economic activity centers on individual workers 
and small business in often small scale and marginal activities. They might on occasion engage a 
co-worker in such activities, but these activities do not normally constitute large scale tax evasion 
or benefit fraud (despite the image in government campaigns; viz. Grabiner 2000). More 
insidious is the extent of activities involving major corporations that engage in boosting paid 
informal economic activities, whether through serial subcontracting or outsourcing. The 
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construction industry is particularly notorious with respect to this practice. A useful distinction 
regarding paid informal economic activities, therefore, is the extent to which it is conducted 
“independently” of the formal economy, or the extent to which it is “dependent” on (and closely 
engaged with) formal economic activities, integral to the supply chain of the formal production 
of goods and services.  
It is important to take a broad perspective on the shadow economy so as to not see it as 
somehow distinct from the formal economy. There are three important points to note 
concerning how the informal economy relates to the formal. The first one is that a consideration 
of the levels of independence of an action permits us to counter the misconception that informal 
economic activities are confined to “identifiable sectors.” This is not to say that certain forms of 
paid informal work are not common to the provision of certain goods and services (e.g., cleaning, 
childcare, catering, construction, etc.), but that it is not exclusively found among certain people 
or places (largely differentiated by class, ethnicity, and citizenship status). Our economic lives are 
variously composed of a mixture of different formal and informal economic activities, and the 
same holds for different places. The informal economy should not, therefore, be considered a 
distinct sector occupied by those who are excluded and marginalized. It should be seen instead 
as a range of different practices and processes closely linked to what goes on within the “formal 
economy” (Sassen 1997).  Indeed, “the informal sector relates to the remainder of the economy 
very differently in different places, reflecting the socio-economic and, crucially, national and local 
political circumstances” (Thomas and Thomas 1994). I might also add internationally. 
The second point is that there is a distinction (not often made in the literature) between the 
production of goods and services through informal economic activity and the way in which such 
goods and services are consumed. I can find no dedicated research on such a distinction and 
whether, for instance, certain goods and services produced by informal economic activity are 
mainly produced in one “type” of place for consumption in another place. Anecdotally, for 
example, we might consider the illegal generation and import of counterfeit consumer products 
(e.g., alcohol, cigarettes, perfumes, etc.) outside of the OECD for consumption within the OECD 
countries, usually by poorer sections of society that are unable or unwilling to afford legitimate 
versions of such products from within the OECD.   
The third point concerns the markets for goods and services produced through informal 
economic activities in the shadow economy. Sander Mateman and Piet Renooy (2001) identify 
three different sets of market relations in informal economic activity: the market for labor, the 
market for goods and services, and the market for information. For the purposes of my argument, 
the market for information is most important. In a “hidden” economy, the sources and 
dissemination of information become highly valuable in themselves due to the submerged and 
sometimes illegal nature of the activities concerned. I explore the function of social capital in the 
informatics of the shadow economy in this paper, but before that I consider the size and extent 
of the shadow economy in the next section. 
 
Dimensions of the Shadow Economy 
 
When deploying their definition of a shadow economy, Schneider and Williams (2013) utilize a 
complex procedure involving multiple indicators and multiple causes (MIMIC), and calibration 
with statistics on the demand for currency within economies (as shadow economic activities 
prioritize payments in cash) to derive estimates of the percentage of GDP attributable to the 
shadow economy. Indicators and causes are variously (i) responses to measures of deterrence with 
respect to tax evasion and benefit fraud, (ii) the burden of tax and social security contributions, 
(iii) regulatory intensity (e.g., labor market regulations, regulations on migrant labor, trade 
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barriers), (iv) decent public services, and (v) level of tax morale in terms of willingness to see 
taxation as fair (which is closely related to perceptions of public service efficiency). It should be 
noted here that “shadow economy” only refers to what I earlier termed paid informal economic 
activity, and, for the analysis conducted by Schneider and Williams, paid illegal economic 
activity, self-provisioning, and mutual aid, are not included for the purposes of measurement. 
Schneider and Williams (2013) derive estimates of the shadow economy as a percentage 
contribution to GDP across twenty-one OECD countries from 1989 to 2012 (in most cases). An 
average is derived across the twenty-one to show that the size of the shadow economy grew across 
the most developed nations from an average 12.67 percent in 1989/1990 to 16 percent in 2007. 
This conceals a slight decline in the shadow economy in more recent years, from a peak of 17.03 
percent in 1999. It also conceals considerable variation between the OECD countries, For 
example, in 2012, Austria had a shadow economy of 7.6 percent of GDP, whereas Greece 
recorded 24 percent and Italy 21.6 percent. 
For a more global examination of shadow economies, Schneider and Williams (2013) draw 
upon the work of Schneider, Büehn, and Montenegro (2010), which is a World Bank sponsored 
study of 162 economies, varying from developed to transitional to developing, over the period 
from 1999 to 2007. This work indicates a general gradation of a shadow economy scale from an 
average of 13.5 percent of GDP in high-income OECD countries, to 38.5 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, to 36.5 percent in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The authors draw three main 
conclusions: 
 
The first conclusion from these results is that for all countries investigated the shadow 
economy has reached a remarkably large size with a weighted (unweighted) average value of 
17.2 (33.1) % of official GDP ...  
 
The second conclusion is that shadow economies are a complex phenomenon 
present to a large extent in all types of economies (developing, transition, and highly 
developed). People engage in shadow economic activities for a variety of reasons — 
especially in response to government actions, most notably, taxation and regulation ... 
 
The third conclusion is that there are regional disparities in the level of informality, but 
obvious regional clusters. At the top level of informality we find Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
at the lowest level of informality we find the OECD countries. (Schneider, Büehn and 
Montenegro 2010, 34) 
 
Clearly, as noted by Schneider, Büehn, and Montenegro (2010), the shadow economy is a 
growing, but complex and globally variable phenomenon. To understand its manifestation and 
the kind of social and political action necessary to regulate it, it must be appreciated in relation 
to the wider informal and formal economy. In this regard the function of social capital is of 
particular interest. 
 
Social Capital and the Shadow Economy 
 
The shadow economy and its various manifestations in the wider informal economy share a main 
characteristic regardless of whether the economic activities described are positive/negative or 
paid/unpaid. In other words, they are economic activities that are either due to the intention or 
obligation of the actor (paid) or due to the biased judgement of wider society (unpaid), generally 
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hidden from view. The very informality of the activities involved puts a premium on what 
Mateman and Renooy (2001) view as the market for information. When activities are largely 
covert or obscured, the sharing of information — often face to face — requires the building of 
trust to enable sustained faith in the veracity of the information regularly shared. This is social 
capital. However, the characteristics of social capital vary in terms of appropriateness to the 
context of the informal economic activity.  
In this section, I examine the character and variations of social capital present in each 
context. In doing so, I am mainly concerned with the notion of social capital attributed to 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). His conceptualization focuses on the 
capital aspect and how social capital is one of a number of different forms of capital resource 
(e.g., physical, financial, human, and cultural).  
Pierre Bourdieu (1986,, 248) defines social capital as “the sum of resources, actual or virtual, 
that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” A further feature of 
Bourdieu’s notion of social capital as a resource is that it is “fungible,” or it can be converted to 
other forms of capital. In addition, Bourdieu’s perspective enables the distinctions of power 
between different groups, including (but not exclusively) social classes, based on their access to 
such durable resources. In terms of social capital, networks, and valuable information, the 
general rule is that the more powerful the group, the more “useful” the connections in it. This 
is clearly pertinent to any analysis of illegal economic activity and, to some degree, to any paid 
informal economic activity, which makes it more appropriate for my purposes here as compared 
to the viewpoints taken by Robert Putnam (2000) or James W. Coleman (1990) (or their 
respective followers). Loïc Wacquant (1998) makes the distinction (appropriate with respect to 
illegal economic activity and the form of social capital present) between positive and negative (or 
perverse) social capital. Allied to a recognition of power distinctions between groups, this 
perspective places a premium on the value of social capital to different groups in this exercise of 
power to gain advantage and further resources. Wacquant quotes Bourdieu as referring to all 
capital as accumulated labor or reified labor where “capital is any resource effective in a 
structured arena of social action” (1998, 26). The conception of social capital as “reified” is 
interesting in that it enables recognition that social capital becomes amenable to 
commodification. Being able to “purchase” (often literally) access to contacts, networks, and 
information provides fresh insight into the potential of social capital in political economy. This 
also moves the concept from a positively regarded and favored panacea of social policymakers to 
being viewed as a neutral but utilizable heuristic device. I consider this conceptualization of social 
capital in terms of each of the categories of informal economic activity that have been 
constructed. 
 
Paid Informal Economic Activity and Social Capital 
 
Working cash in hand and off the books usually requires information from close connections, 
either of existing family and friends, or acquaintances met and nurtured in meeting places, such 
as bars and cafes, in order to access similar work. The form of social capital that is most prevalent 
in such a context is thus close bonding social capital among those already trusted and sharing 
common features of identity. Ethnic bonds, especially among recently arrived migrants to a labor 
force, are a typical case in point. Paid informal work is often a means to integrate lower skilled 
immigrant labor, which connects to the likelihood of the presence of migrants of similar ethnicity 
in specific urban neighborhoods, some of which have long served as reception areas for new 
migrants. It is usually the case that we identify such bonding social capital as serving a negative 
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purpose, since it cloaks tax avoidance and sometimes benefit fraud. However, this again depends 
on whether the context is one of a structural dependency, such as, for example, unscrupulous 
employers hiring workers off the books to drive wage rates down and avoid other regulatory 
requirements associated with hiring labor. But it is also the case that vulnerable, often migrant 
labor is utilizing such social capital networks of information for reasons of “need not greed” 
(Katungi 2007). Paid informal work is often a coping strategy for those excluded from the formal 
labor market for whatever reason or otherwise in circumstances of low income. Additionally, if 
paid informal work is conducted independently in single-person, own-account trades, the 
bonding social capital deployed is positively associated with entrepreneurship, business building, 
and small scale economic growth. Colin C. Williams and Jan Windebank (2002) go one step 
further and suggest that some paid informal work can also be viewed as “cash mediated 
reciprocity,” That is, one-to-one mutual aid where cash is reinstated as the currency in 
circumstances where other life pressures or an absence of mutually demanded goods and services 
are likely to preclude the possibility of some parties repaying the favor in kind. Such embedded 
reciprocity is clearly an instance of positive, localized social capital. However, this obviously does 
not preclude the importance of cash exchange in informal economic activity in itself as an 
element of coping strategies, as noted earlier.  
 
Illegal Economic Activity and Social Capital 
 
The nature of illegal economic activity and the differential power relationships often evident 
within groups and gangs means that, while close bonding social capital is evident, it has negative 
associations and brings exclusion. Moreover, a case might be made that, given the rigid 
hierarchies often evident in gangs, the form of social capital involved is identifiable as linking 
social capital where the relationships are more vertical than horizontal (where relationships are 
between equals). The relationship between “younger” runners and “elder” procurers and 
suppliers in London drug gangs is a case in point (Lupton et al. 2002). The arguments for the 
presence of linking social capital, however, are not convincing. Where is the sense of reciprocity 
and trust in relationships of mutually acknowledged inequalities of power? Terms, such as 
“honor among thieves” indicate the importance of what is recognizable as social capital. 
Nonetheless, this is still social capital of a negative or perverse variety. It may not be of benefit to 
the wider society, but it is still crucial to the survival strategies of those involved. Mauricio Rubio 
(1997) argues that social capital is not invariably a “productive” (or positive) asset, favoring 
economic efficiency in a society. He takes on the argument that juvenile delinquency is the result 
of an absence of social capital, which allows viewing the relationships within gangs of young men 
(and increasingly young women) as displaying the characteristics of social capital — symbolized 
identities, tight networks and the requisite displays of trust. 
In both paid informal work and illegal economic activities, the presence of tax evasion is a 
given if only because of the unauthorized and/or outright criminal activities that are going on. 
The intent or offer to register and pay taxes risks exposing the broad range of illegal and criminal 
activities present. The damage done both by small scale tax evasion and large scale corporate 
fraud extends beyond the loss of revenue, to the impact on public service affordability and 
provisioning, as well as on citizens’ tax morale to keep paying taxes when others get away with 
not paying them. Joel Slemrod (1998) makes the point that, if we take citizens’ willingness to pay 
taxes as an indicator of social capital on a national level, then the cost of government operations 
and services would be reduced, which benefits society as whole. Conversely, tax evasion and its 
implications destroy social capital at a national level. Dongwood Lee (2013, 252) provides 
empirical evidence from a sample of 65 countries, concluding that “higher level of social trust 
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and norms (e.g., tax morale), as well as a comprehensive measure of social capital, are associated 
with the lower size of the shadow economy.” Johanna D’Hernoncourt and Pierre-Guillaume 
Méon (2012, 98) consider that, “if the shadow economy is a form of tax evasion, then one should 
expect its size to be negatively impacted by trust.” Therefore, there are no positive consequences 
of social capital associated with tax evasion, although networks sharing information as to ways to 
avoid taxation can generate social capital, regardless of whether cash changes hands to access the 
information provided by contacts accessible through such networks.   
 
Social Capital and Unremunerated Activities in the Shadow 
Economy 
 
Including the role of durable networks as social capital assets, which enhance economic 
advantages within the remunerated sector of the shadow economy, indicates that this activity is 
an imperative for the support and leverage of disadvantaged groups of the working class. 
However, it is also an aspect in relationships that is a beneficial though largely hidden element 
of the activities of powerful groups and organizations in both organized crime and international 
capital. The activities of global corporations in initiating a chain of serial outsourcing across the 
globe, involving corrupt collusion with state officials in the exploitation of unregulated labor, is 
well documented, especially with respect to female labor (Carr and Chen 2001; Goel and 
Saunoris 2014; Mehrotra and Biggeri 2002). Criminal networks and gangs are dependent upon 
strong resources of bonding social capital to enable their economic advantage (Lederman, Loayza 
and Menéndez 2002; Rubio 1997).  
Informal economic activities in the shadow economy that are not remunerated 
(characterized here as self-provisioning and mutual aid), and their availability as appropriable and 
fungible resources, are seemingly benign and beneficial to the economic wellbeing of individuals 
and groups that can access them. However, the potential for such social capital networks to 
provide substitute goods and services in lieu of public services can be captured to the advantage 
of agencies promoting liberalization and deregulation of the economy (Hadiz and Robison 2005; 
Molyneux 2002). I consider these activities in the next section. 
 
Self-Provisioning and Social Capital 
 
Self-provisioning activities, or providing  services for consumption by oneself and one’s family 
(largely through heavily gendered and unpaid domestic labor) that would otherwise have to be 
procured on the open market and paid for, relies upon close bonding social capital and generates 
positive associations almost exclusively for family and immediate kin. The form of social capital 
produced and relied upon in this case is very insular and exclusive. There are a constellation of 
policy initiatives, mainly in the advanced economies, which facilitate self-provisioning, thereby 
generating this kind of social capital. In the UK, policy initiatives since the turn of the 
millennium, such as the National Childcare Strategy, the Working Families’ and the Children’s 
Tax Credits and the New Deal for Lone Parents, present significant opportunities for 
formalization of self-provisioning and for advancing from a family-based social capital to a more 
communal, mutual-aid-based one. However, there are a range of cultural factors (particularly 
ethnicity and social class) that tend to perpetuate self-provisioning as unremunerated activities, 
despite the often heavy burden on female household members in deprived neighborhoods. It is 
the reification of such familial relationships and the bonds of trust therein that, in this case, 
generate social capital as a commodity. The importance of such social capital networks in the 
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informal economy for growth in the formal economy is well-established. Self-provisioning is a 
significant area of economic activity. Whereas just half of the UK population’s work time is spent 
in formal work, over 46 percent is spent in self-provisioning activities (Ruston 2003). By contrast, 
only 3.0 percent of people’s time was spent on mutual aid activities. Much of the mutual aid 
activities remains hidden and remains largely unmeasured. This is mainly because mutual aid is 
largely conceptualized based on a community aid level (i.e., formal aid) as opposed to the one-to-
one aid of the familial and “neighborly” variety (Bulmer 1986; Williams and Windebank 1999).  
 
Mutual Aid and Social Capital 
 
The unpaid and largely selfless nature of informal economic activities of mutual aid is the only 
context in which bridging social capital within and across neighborhoods and communities 
might emerge in the informal economy with positive associations through development of 
initiatives, such as Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETs), Timebanks, Credit Unions, etc. 
(Evans 2007). This is virtuous or positive social capital generated and perpetuated for fungible 
purposes with both potential and a track record of connecting and building relationships of trust 
between groups and communities of diverse identities, in addition to building bonding among 
people of the same identity (Evans 2007; European Commission 2007b). There is ground to 
suggest that the informal economic activities, promoted through LETs schemes and Timebanks 
(and their alternative) as well as unconventional and ersatz currencies do promote and constitute 
tax evasion. On the other hand, however, voluntarily provided goods and services reduce unit 
costs of production and augment the range of public services, in some cases substituting for them 
(e.g., public library provision in the UK), but they also crowd out private for-profit provision. 
The social capital inherent in networks of informal economic activities, conducted in terms of 
mutual aid, is less commoditized. This is essentially because it is generated in a context of 
reciprocity of intention and aim, and not characterized by inequalities of power. Thus, mutual 
aid activities engender potential for resilience of disadvantaged groups that share social capital 
networks. But it also supports the continuance of existing power relations in the formal economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have outlined and examined the various characterizations of the shadow economy, and the way 
these complex and diverse manifestations of informal economic activity generate and utilize 
social capital. Across the different contexts of informal economic activity, it is evident that the 
shadow economy of both paid and illegal informal economic activity is strong in the production 
and reliance upon bonding social capital to the extent of insularity. The consequences of social 
capital in such contexts are largely negative for the wider society, enabling a perspective on the 
concept that runs counter to that which is dominant in media and policy circles and which 
reveals its darker side. Regardless of whether social capital is perceived as positive or negative in 
its consequences for economic development, I hope to have opened a space for further 
examining the extent to which the concept reflects the reification and commoditization of social 
relationships in the late capitalist era. 
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